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1. One can know without observation what one is up to, but can one 
know without observation what someone else is up to? I shall 
explore two strategies for defending the claim that one can. The 
first strategy relies on the fact that one can know what someone is 
doing by accepting what they tell one about what they are doing. It 
proposes that testimony can preserve the credentials of a piece of 
knowledge so that if a benefactor has non-observational knowledge, 
then a recipient of their testimony can acquire non-observational 
knowledge by accepting it. The second strategy appeals to the 
existence of collective activities. It proposes that where a number 
of people engage in a collective activity, each can know what each is 
up to, and that knowledge can be had without observation. My goal 
is to set out both strategies. A secondary aim is to suggest grounds 
for greater optimism about the prospects of the first strategy than 
the second. For concreteness, I’ll develop both strategies in the 
context of G. E. M. Anscombe’s treatment of non-observational 
knowledge in Intention (Anscombe 1957). 
 §2 outlines Anscombe’s account of non-observational 
knowledge. §3–5 develop the first strategy, drawing also on work by 
Tyler Burge (Burge 1993, 1997). §6–7 develop the second strategy, 
drawing on work by Ben Laurence (Laurence 2011). 
 
 
2. Anscombe’s treatment of non-observational knowledge begins 
with knowledge of the position of one’s limbs: 
 
…a man usually knows the position of his limbs without observation. 
It is without observation because nothing shews him the position of 
his limbs; it is not as if he were going by a tingle in his knee, which 
is the sign that it is bent and not straight (Anscombe 1957: §8). 
 
                                                        
1 I’m grateful for comments and discussion to Olle Blomberg, Thomas Crowther, Julien 
Dutant, Naomi Eilan, Keith Hossack, Hemdat Lerman, Eliot Michaelson, Eylem 
Özaltun, Sebastian Rödl, Johannes Roessler, Glenda Satne, Hamid Taieb, Mark Textor. 
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Anscombe’s thought has three components. The first component is 
a conception of observational knowledge, on which it is acquired 
through sensitivity to a correlation between specific appearances 
and specific positions. The second is that no such sensitivity 
underpins one’s ability to know the position of one’s limbs. Bodily 
sensations are not correlated with limb position in the way that 
sensible appearances are correlated with the positions of observable 
objects. Indeed, one’s ability to locate bodily sensations seems to 
derive from, rather than explain, one’s ability to know the position 
of one’s limbs. The third is that insofar as bodily sensations figure 
in knowing limb position, they figure differently from the ways 
experiences of appearances figure in knowing the positions of 
observable objects: 
 
It is not ordinarily possible to find anything that shows one that 
one’s leg is bent. It may indeed be that it is because one has 
sensations that one knows this; but that does not mean that one 
knows it by identifying the sensations one has. (Anscombe 1957: 
§28) 
 
Bodily sensations support knowledge of the position of one’s limbs 
not by presenting one with appearances of position, but by enabling 
an ability to know without observation. Adopting a distinction of 
Plato’s, bodily sensations do not cause knowledge of limb position; 
rather, they make possible the causing of that knowledge: 
 
If someone said that without bones and sinews and all such things, 
I should not be able to do what I decided, he would be right, but 
surely to say that they are the cause of what I do, and not that I have 
chosen the best course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak 
very lazily and carelessly. Imagine not being able to distinguish the 
real cause from that without which the cause would not be able to 
act as a cause (Plato Phaedo: 99a–b). 
 
Plato focuses on the causation of activity rather than knowledge. 
Anscombe connects the topics in a distinctive way. She argues that 
where we have non-observational knowledge of what we are doing, 
our knowledge is distinctively practical, in that it causes, rather than 
being caused by, those activities: 
 
Practical knowledge is ‘the cause of what it understands’, unlike 
‘speculative’ knowledge, which is ‘derived from the objects known’ 
(Anscombe 1957: §48, drawing on Aquinas Summa Theologica: Ia 
IIae, Q3, art. 5, obj. 1). 
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Speculative knowledge—including observational knowledge and 
non-observational knowledge of limb position—is receptive. It is 
caused by the facts of which it is knowledge. Practical knowledge, 
by contrast, is productive. It brings about the facts of which it is 
knowledge. (In both cases, the mode of causation may be formal 
rather than efficient.) 
One articulation of Anscombe’s position appeals to the idea 
that knowing something requires holding something to be true. The 
form of holding true required by speculative knowledge is receptive 
and amounts to a form of believing. The mode of holding true 
required by practical knowledge is productive. It is not, therefore, a 
form of believing, but rather a form of holding true that one will j, 
or that one will try to j, that is essentially directed towards j-ing, 
or trying to. This mode of holding true is sustained by one’s 
intending to j. Where one’s holding true in this form, or the 
intending to j that sustains one’s holding true, brings about one’s 
j-ing, it sustains practical knowledge that one is j-ing. It is “the 
cause of what it understands”. So, intending to j can sustain non-
observational knowledge that one is j-ing. (This articulation draws 
on Soteriou 2013: 257–316. It avoids difficulties that arise for views 
on which practical knowledge requires belief—for example the need 
to explain away the seeming irrationality of coming to believe that 
one will j just in response to practical reasons for j-ing, and the 
need to deal with purported cases of someone’s intending to j 
without believing they will succeed. For discussion of such 
difficulties and an attempt to defend a belief-based approach, see 
Setiya 2008.) 
Anscombe considers an objection to the claim that intending 
can be a mode of non-observational knowledge: 
 
‘Known without observation’ may very well be a justifiable formula 
for knowledge of the position and movement of one’s limbs, but you 
have spoken of all intentional actions as falling under this concept. 
Now it may be e.g. that one paints a wall yellow, meaning to do so. 
But is it reasonable to say that one ‘knows without observation’ that 
one is painting a wall yellow? And similarly for all sorts of actions: 
any actions that is, that are described under any aspect beyond that 
of bodily movements (Anscombe 1957: §28). 
 




…the topic of an intention may be matter on which there is 
knowledge or opinion based on observation, inference, hearsay, 
superstition or anything that knowledge or opinion ever are based 
on; or again matter on which an opinion is held without any 
foundation at all. When knowledge or opinion are present 
concerning what is the case, and what can happen—say Z—if one 
does certain things, say ABC, then it is possible to have the 
intention of doing Z in doing ABC; and if the case is one of 
knowledge or if the opinion is correct, then doing or causing Z is an 
intentional action, and it is not by observation that one knows one 
is doing Z…” (Anscombe 1957: §28). 
 
It can be a necessary condition on the execution of an intention to 
j that one have observational knowledge of the matter that forms 
its topic. But that knowledge does not cause one’s intending, or 
usurp its role in constituting practical knowledge. Rather, it makes 
possible the successful, and so knowledgeable, execution of 
intention. It enables one’s holding true that one will j to bring 
about one’s j-ing in a way that sustains knowledge without 
observation that one is j-ing. One’s observational knowledge does 
not combine with non-observational knowledge of what one 
intends, and of what is happening to one’s body, to furnish partly 
observational knowledge of what one is up to. It enables one to 
execute intentions that go beyond mere bodily movements, and so 
to know without observation what one is doing. 
 
 
3. Anscombe provides an account of knowledge of what one is up to 
that is non-observational. What account does she offer of one’s 
knowledge of another’s intentions? 
 
Well, if you want to say at least some true things about a man’s 
intentions, you will have a strong chance of success if you mention 
what he actually did or is doing. For whatever else he may intend, or 
whatever may be his intentions in doing what he does, the greater 
number of the things which you would say straight off a man did or 
was doing, will be things he intends… 
…That is to say, in a very large number of cases, your selection 
from the immense variety of true statements about him which you 
might make would coincide with what he could say that he was 
doing, perhaps even without reflection, certainly without adverting 
to observation. I am sitting in a chair writing, and anyone grown to 
the age of reason in the same world would know this as soon as he 
saw me, and in general it would be his first account of what I was 
doing… (Anscombe 1957: §4). 
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Anscombe’s proposes that one can often recognise someone’s 
intentions by observing what they are doing and recognising that 
they are doing it intentionally. Now what they are doing 
intentionally coincides with that of which they have practical 
knowledge. One’s initial view about what they are doing 
intentionally can therefore be undermined by the discovery that 
they lack such knowledge. Furthermore, punctate observation 
seems to reveal, at most, some of what someone is doing. Some of 
what they are doing may become apparent only later; and the further 
intentions with which they are currently acting might never be 
revealed. Thus, Anscombe continues: 
 
Now it can easily seem that in general the question what a man’s 
intentions are is only authoritatively settled by him. One reason for 
this is that in general we are interested, not just in a man’s intention 
of doing what he does, but in his intention in doing it, and this can 
very often not be seen from seeing what he does. Another is that in 
general the question whether he intends to do what he does just 
does not arise (because the answer is obvious); while if it does arise, 
it is rather often settled by asking him. And, finally, a man can form 
an intention which he then does nothing to carry out, either because 
he is prevented or because he changes his mind… (Anscombe 1957: 
§4) 
 
Central to Anscombe’s project is showing that there are significant 
controls on what someone can intend, many of which arise from 
connections between what they intend and what they do. The 
obtaining of such controls doesn’t entail that people cannot 
authoritatively settle their intentions, but it limits the extent to 
which their expressions of intention are, in general, decisive. That 
proviso understood, it is obvious that questions about someone’s 
intentions are often settled (only) by accepting their expressions of 
intention. Anscombe provides a further example: 
 
…when a doctor says to a patient in the presence of a nurse ‘Nurse 
will take you to the operating theatre’, this may function both as an 
expression of his intention (if it is in it that his decision as to what 
shall happen gets expressed) and as an order, as well as being 
information to the patient; and it is the latter in spite of being in no 
sense an estimate of the future founded on evidence, nor yet a guess 
or prophecy; nor does the patient normally infer the information 
from the fact that the doctor said that; he would say that the doctor 
told him” (Anscombe 1957: § 2). 
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So, Anscombe endorses the natural view that one can acquire 
knowledge of what someone is up to by accepting what they tell one. 
The knowledge that they express is without observation. Our 
question is whether knowledge acquired by accepting what they say 
can also be non-observational. 
Anscombe rejects one ground for answering negatively. It’s 
plausible that knowledge of the fact that the doctor said that nurse 
will take one to theatre is observational knowledge. And it’s 
plausible that knowledge that is inferred from observational 
knowledge is observationally tainted. It’s therefore plausible that if 
one’s knowledge that nurse will take one to theatre was inferred 
from the doctor’s having said she will, then it would be 
observational. However, Anscombe rejects the premise that the 
knowledge is so inferred. Beyond that, Anscombe seems to leave the 
answer to our question open. (Anscombe 1962, 1973, 1979.)  
 
 
4. Tyler Burge argues that a fundamental entitlement to accept what 
one is told is apriori and so, in our terms, non-observational. 
Accepting what one is told on the basis of that entitlement enables 
one’s consequent beliefs to draw epistemic support from that 
accruing to one’s interlocutor’s beliefs. So, if what one it told 
expresses non-observational knowledge, the core of Burge’s account 
seems consistent with the possibility that one might acquire non-
observationally supported beliefs by accepting it. 
Burge’s argument is built around a defence of what he calls the 
Acceptance Principle: 
 
A person is apriori entitled to accept a proposition that is [taken to be] 
presented as true and that is [seemingly] intelligible to him, unless there are 
stronger reasons not to do so (Burge 1997: 287 fn.4, his italics and 
interpolations; the original may be found in Burge 1993: 237). 
 
Burge’s idea is that the prima facie intelligibility of a seeming 
expression of content combines with the Acceptance Principle to 
provide an entitlement to take it to have a source that is prima facie 
rational. And its having a prima facie rational source combines with 
the Acceptance Principle to provide an entitlement to take the 
content to be prima facie true. Thus, one’s seeming comprehension 
of a seemingly intelligible assertion can, when undefeated, furnish 
one with an entitlement to accept what one seems to comprehend.  
Burge holds, in addition, that where one genuinely 
comprehends an intelligible assertion and accepts what is asserted, 
one’s belief can derive support from whatever further entitlements 
support the belief that one’s interlocutor expressed in the assertion. 
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In particular, if one’s interlocutor expressed knowledge, then one 
can acquire knowledge by accepting what they said. And if the 
entitlements supporting one’s interlocutor’s belief were apriori, 
then they retain that status in supporting one’s belief. 
One’s entitlement to a belief formed by accepting what one’s 
interlocutor asserted will comprise three components: one’s 
entitlement to one’s comprehension of their assertion; one’s 
entitlement to accept what one comprehended; and one’s 
interlocutor’s own entitlement to the belief they express. We have 
that the Acceptance Principle that sustains the first two 
components is warranted apriori, and we are considering a case in 
which one’s interlocutor’s belief is warranted apriori. Let’s assume 
that the principle connecting acceptance with inheritance of one’s 
interlocutor’s entitlements is also apriori. In that case, Burge’s 
account will sustain the possibility of one’s acquiring apriori 
knowledge by accepting what one is told just in case one’s 
entitlement to one’s comprehension of an assertion can itself be 
apriori. 
The claim that one’s entitlement to comprehension of an 
assertion can be apriori is apt to seem implausible. Burge initially 
sought to defend the claim by appeal to a distinction between 
warrant and enabling conditions akin to that exploited by 
Anscombe. He took it that the implausibility of the view that 
comprehension can be apriori derived from the essential role played 
in comprehension by the perception of speech or writing. Because 
perception is essential to comprehension, it is apt to seem obvious 
that comprehension itself must be perceptual. In response, Burge 
argued that speech perception doesn’t figure as an element in one’s 
entitlement to comprehension. Rather, that entitlement is 
underwritten by one’s apriori entitlement to rely on the proper 
operation of one’s capacity to understand contents. Speech 
perception serves to enable that operation, but doesn’t add any 
element to one’s entitlement. As he puts it, 
 
I acknowledged that all successful exercises of comprehension of 
others assertions depend causally on perception. I maintained, 
however, that the role of perception in comprehending another’s 
speech or writing is sometimes purely that of an enabling condition. 
Although perception is necessary for the success of our 
comprehension, I claimed that perception does not always 
contribute to the force of one warrant that we have for relying on 
an exercise [of] comprehension (Burge 2013: 274). 
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Burge supported that claim about the role of speech perception in 
comprehension by appeal to an analogy with the role of preservative 
memory in reasoning: 
 
…even if one’s entitlement to rely upon one’s seeming 
understanding always lapsed when one lacks entitlement to rely 
upon one’s (apparent) perception of what the other person uttered, 
it would not follow that one’s entitlement to rely upon one’s 
seeming understanding is empirical. Take any piece of reasoning in 
which one relies upon preservative memory but (say, because it 
malfunctions) in which one is not entitled to do so. Such a piece of 
reasoning will fail to warrant acceptance of its conclusion. But 
preservative memory does not contribute to the justificational force 
of reasoning. It makes reasoning possible without contributing to 
its force. I think that the perception normally involved in 
understanding putative assertions plays a similar role in the 
epistemology of interlocution (Burge 1997: 293). 
 
There is a distinction amongst the factors that explain one’s being 
warranted in accepting something between those elements that 
figure essentially in one’s warrant—e.g., premises in a proof—and 
those elements that enable the first set of elements to figure in one’s 
warrant without themselves figuring as such elements—e.g., 
preservative memory of the premises. Burge’s idea was that in cases 
in which one acquires warrant by accepting what someone asserts, 
comprehension supplies essential elements in one’s warrant, while 
speech perception plays only an enabling role with respect to those 
elements. Just as preservative memory can figure essentially in 
explaining one’s possession of warrant without making the warrant 
observational, so speech perception can figure essentially in 
explaining one’s possession of warrant without making the warrant 
observational. 
If Burge’s defence of the possible apriority of comprehension 
had succeeded, then it might have provided the basis for an account 
of non-observational knowledge of another’s intentions. Where 
someone told one what they were up to, perception of their speech 
could enable non-observational seeming comprehension of what 
they said. The Acceptance Principle could then sustain an apriori 
warrant for accepting the seeming comprehension as veridical and 
then accepting what one was told. That would provide a non-
observational warrant for accepting what they told one about what 
they were up to. It would thereby enable one’s consequent belief to 
acquire knowledge-supporting warrant from one’s interlocutor’s 
own proprietary warrant for their view of what they were up to. 
Since that proprietary warrant is non-observational, one’s overall 
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warrant would include no essentially observational elements. In that 
way, we would have an account of the possibility of non-
observational knowledge of another’s intentions. However, as Burge 
came to accept, the proposed account fails at the first step. 
The account fails at the first step because the claim that 
comprehension of another’s speech can be apriori is indefensible. It 
is plausible that speech perception doesn’t supply an independent 
element in a warrant for comprehension. It is plausible, in 
particular, that speech perception doesn’t supply the basis for an 
inferential warrant for comprehension. However, it doesn’t follow 
that speech perception plays only an enabling role. For it is 
consistent with that, and independently plausible, that 
comprehension is partly constituted by speech perception. 
Furthermore, even if comprehension were only enabled by speech 
perception, that would not make plausible that comprehension is 
not perceptual. The role of comprehension in delivering, or 
constituting, autonomous knowledge of particular episodes of 
others’ speech would still seem incompatible with its being a non-
perceptual power. (Burge 2011: 272–284 recants his earlier treatment 
of comprehension. See also Longworth 2008; Malmgren 2006.)  
 
 
5. If Burge’s proposal were the only way of securing the possibility 
of non-observational testimonial knowledge, then there would be 
no way of carrying through the first strategy. However, the failure 
of Burge’s proposal is due not only to the fact that comprehension 
perceptual, but also to the specific role it gives comprehension. On 
Burge’s proposal, the deliverances of comprehension figure as 
elements in a warrant for accepting what an interlocutor presents as 
true. Thus, the observational status of those elements is inherited 
by one’s accepting what an interlocutor presents. An alternative 
would be to develop an account on which the deliverances of 
comprehension figure not as elements in the warrant that one 
acquires (or supplements) by accepting what one is told, but rather 
as enabling one to inherit one’s interlocutor’s warrant. On the 
alternative proposal, the status of comprehension, as observational 
or not, would be irrelevant to the status of attitudes formed in 
accepting what one is told. 
Burge’s own proposal treats comprehension and acceptance of 
what someone asserts as sorts of enabling conditions and so a 
natural way of pursuing the first strategy would be to develop that 
aspect of his proposal. Burge distinguishes one’s proprietary warrant 
for accepting what someone asserts from an extended warrant that 
incorporates warrants attaching to the attitude one’s interlocutor 
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expressed in their assertion. Consider one’s purely extended 
warrant—that is, one’s extended warrant minus the proprietary 
warrant provided by the interaction of seeming comprehension and 
the Acceptance Principle. One’s acceptance of what an interlocutor 
asserts enables the purely extended warrant to support beliefs one 
forms through acceptance. Proprietarily warranted acceptance is a 
necessary condition for acquiring support from the purely extended 
warrant, rather than an element in the purely extended warrant. 
Attending only to the purely extended warrant, one’s proprietary 
warrant for accepting what one’s interlocutor says as an enabling 
condition, making it possible for one to draw support from the 
purely extended warrant. 
Focusing still on the purely extended warrant, a natural 
question concerns its role in supporting beliefs formed in accepting 
what an interlocutor says. Insofar as the purely extended warrant is 
insufficient to sustain knowledge, that will suggest that a warrant 
that is sufficient for knowledge would have to include elements 
from one’s proprietary warrant. In that case, the proprietary warrant 
couldn’t play only an enabling role. So, in cases in which one’s 
interlocutor expresses knowledge, is the purely extended warrant 
they thereby make available sufficient to support one’s acquiring 
knowledge by accepting what one is told? 
On the face of it, one’s purely extended warrant seems 
sufficient to support one’s acquiring knowledge. After all, one’s 
interlocutor knows, and their warrant seems to be exhausted by 
one’s purely extended warrant. However, that appearance relies on 
the idea that beliefs formed on the basis of accepting what one is 
told can gain support from the entirety of the purely extended 
warrant. A natural alternative would be that one’s interlocutor’s 
purely extended warrant divides into components sustained by the 
Acceptance Principle and extrinsic components, with the latter 
incorporating inputs to the operations of the Acceptance Principle 
together with properties like circumstantial reliability. Since one’s 
beliefs would automatically draw support from the operations of the 
Acceptance Principle, it would be needless for the purely extended 
warrant supplied by one’s interlocutor to also incorporate those 
operations. It would suffice that one drew support only from the 
extrinsic components of one’s interlocutor’s warrant, which could 
then combine with proprietary operations of the Acceptance 
Principle. On this alternative, interlocution imposes a filter on 
access to the purely extended warrant through which only extrinsic 
components of that warrant pass.  
That line of thought shows that a proponent of Burge’s 
account is not compelled to accept that the purely extended warrant 
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that is preserved through interlocution suffices for knowledge. 
However, that is so only to the extent that the Acceptance Principle 
and its operations figure universally—not only in helping to 
constitute one’s proprietary warrant, but also in helping to 
constitute one’s interlocutor’s proprietary warrant. It leaves open 
that the purely extended warrant would suffice for knowledge in the 
absence of operations of the Acceptance Principle that are strictly 
proprietary, including those facilitating the endorsement of 
instances of seeming comprehension. So, even if we were willing to 
accept that the universal applicability of the Acceptance Principle 
serves as a filter on the elements of the purely extended warrant that 
transmit support via interlocution, that is consistent with viewing 
comprehension as enabling the transmission of the purely extended 
warrant, rather than providing elements in one’s warrant. 
If this proposal could be made out, it would provide an account 
on which it is possible to acquire non-observational knowledge of 
others’ intentions. Where one’s interlocutor gives expression to 
non-observational knowledge of what they intend to do, one can 
acquire knowledge of what they intend to do by accepting what they 
say. The warrant underwriting that knowledge is constituted by its 
purely extended warrant, the non-observational warrant 
underwriting the interlocutor’s knowledge. Observation, in the 
form of comprehension of what the interlocutor says, is necessary 
for acquiring support from that warrant. But it figures only as an 
enabling condition, rather than as an element in one’s warrant. 
Thus, the knowledge one acquires by accepting what one’s 
interlocutor says is underwritten by a wholly non-observational 
warrant.  
The proposal represents the first strategy for explaining the 
possibility of non-observational knowledge of what others are up to. 
A full defence of the proposal would have to say more about the 
distinction between elements in a warrant and enablers for those 
elements, as well as the specific application of that distinction 
according to which comprehension can play a merely enabling role 
with respect to warrants accessed through interlocution. However, 
enough has been said to suggest that the proposal is worth pursuing. 
In the next section, I turn to the second strategy. 
 
 
6. The second strategy for explaining non-observational knowledge 
of what others are up to derives from the possibility of collective 
activities. This section begins to clarify the notion of collective 
intentional activity in advance of developing the second strategy in 
the following section. 
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Collective activities are activities undertaken by a number of 
individuals acting together. More carefully, let’s follow Alex Oliver 
and Timothy Smiley in marking a distinction between distributive 
and collective forms of predicates: 
 
A predicate F is distributive if it is analytic that F is true of some 
things iff it is true of each of them separately. It is collective if it is 
not distributive. (Oliver and Smiley 2013: 3) 
 
We can begin to see the importance of the distinction by 
considering Socrates’ response to Hippias’ assumption that all 
predication is distributive: 
 
HIPPIAS: …If both of us were just, wouldn’t each of us be too? Or 
if each of us were unjust, wouldn’t both of us? Or if we were healthy, 
wouldn’t each be? Or if each of us had some sickness or were 
wounded or stricken or had any other tribulation, again, wouldn’t 
both of us have that attribute? (Plato Greater Hippias: 301e. There is 




SOCRATES: But now, we have been instructed by you that if two 
is what we both are, two is what each of us must be as well; and if 
each if one, then both must be one as well. (Plato Greater Hippias: 
301e.) 
 
Socrates reduces Hippias’ assumption to absurdity and reports: 
 
SOCRATES: Then it’s not entirely necessary…that whatever is true 
of both is also true of each, and that whatever is true of each is also 
true of both. (Plato Greater Hippias: 302b.) 
 
Socrates focuses on collective number predicates—for example, “are 
one” and “are two”. But there are numerous other examples of 
collective predicates: “are many”; “live together”; “made up The 
Beatles”; “sung a duet”; “solved the equation”. With this distinction 
in hand, we can characterize a collective activity as an activity 
undertaken by some individuals and where the most fundamental 
characterisation of the activity is provided by a collective predicate. 
Thus, where Russell and Whitehead were solving an equation 
together, the fundamental characterisation of their activity was 
“solving an equation”. And that characterisation can have been true 
of them without its following analytically that Russell was solving 
the equation or that Whitehead was. 
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It may be that it is possible to say more about the conditions 
in which a given collective predicate is true of some things. For 
example, it may be possible to say more about what Whitehead and 
Russell were up to individually that made it true that they were 
solving the equation. Indeed, it would be consistent with a predicate 
F’s being collective that necessary and sufficient conditions for its 
applicability can be framed using only distributive predicates. All 
that is ruled out by the definition is that such necessary and 
sufficient conditions are both analytic and given in terms of the 
applicability of the target predicate, F. However, there is no obvious 
reason to expect that provision of non-analytic necessary and 
sufficient conditions will be possible with respect to any collective 
predicate. Indeed, it’s plausible that insofar as necessary and 
sufficient conditions are available, they will essentially involve 
further collective predicates. For example, we might find plausible 
that where some individuals are collectively j-ing, each of them 
must be doing something or other. And we might find plausible that 
each of them must be contributing to the collective  j-ing. But 
neither thought supports the idea that independent specifications 
of their individual activities will provide necessary or sufficient 
conditions for their collective j-ing. For example, Russell’s 
contribution might count as such only in light of Whitehead’s, and 
vice versa, so that specification of their individual contributions 
wouldn’t suffice for their j-ing. Similarly, Russell might have made 
a lesser contribution while Whitehead took up the slack, so that 
Russell’s actual contribution was not necessary for their j-ing. And 
there are fewer grounds for optimism that such an account could be 
provided for collective predicates of activities in general. In advance 
of detailed inquiry, there is little reason to expect that it will be 
possible to say anything very general about what all and only cases 
of collective activities have in common beyond those following 
simply from their being activities that are susceptible to 
fundamental characterisation by appeal to collective predicates. 
There are bound to be numerous differences amongst different 
forms of collective activities. But such differences will trace to 
differences in the natures of the activities, rather than to differences 
in the ways in which those activities are jointly undertaken. There 
are also bound to be numerous differences amongst instances of a 
given form of collective activity. Such differences will trace to 
differences in the specific contributions made by individual 
participants in the collective activity and the ways in which those 
contributions are integrated in pursuit of the activity. There are no 
obvious grounds to expect it to be useful to appeal, in addition to 
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these differences in activity and its implementation, to a range of 
different ways of being collective over and above the minimal 
characterisation offered here. 
In light of what we should and shouldn’t expect, our default 
position should be a form of minimalism about collective activities, 
according to which their being collective is wholly captured by their 
being susceptible to fundamental characterisation by non-
distributive predicates. We shouldn’t expect to be able to say 
anything more general about what all such activities have in 
common or about what all instances of some activity-type have in 
common. Differences amongst collective activities are differences 
either in the activities undertaken or in the specific ways in which 
instances are undertaken. 
We can begin to assess this minimalist proposal about 
collective activity by considering an attempt to go beyond it. Ben 
Laurence presents an Anscombe-inspired account of a general 
distinction amongst cases of activities. He begins by considering 
pairs of cases which he takes to exemplify the distinction, e.g.: 
 
(2a) A band of robbers plans to knock over Mellon Bank. The 
getaway driver sits in an alley behind the bank with his engine idling, 
while inside the safecracker listens to the safe with a stethoscope. 
While the safe is being cracked several burly men stuff money from 
the teller’s drawer hastily into sacks…. 
(2b) A man happens to be parked in an alley behind Mellon 
Bank with his engine idling. Among the sidewalk pedestrians, 
several men carrying sacks and one with a stethoscope—all total 
strangers—happen to be passing by the bank at the time when 
another man opening the bank door yells “It’s a stick-up!” Pushing 
inside, each man hopes to get some money for himself. While the 
man with the stethoscope listens to the sage the other men stuff 
money into sacks…. (Laurence 2011: 273.) 
 
Laurence characterises his task as follows: 
 
In…these contrasting pairs of cases the same actions (in some sense) 
were performed with the same outcome, but still there remains an 
inner difference. In the first of…these cases we have a group of 
agents acting together, while in the second…we have a mere 
diversity of agents acting on their own. What could account for this 
inner difference? (Laurence 2011: 273.) 
 
Laurence aims to describe a general distinction between cases in 
which a group of agents acts together and cases in which a mere 
diversity of agents acts alone. Minimalism, by contrast, allows that 
there is no such single distinction between the cases. The second 
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case, as much as the first, involves collective activity—for example, 
removing all of the money from the bank, something none of 
individual participants achieves on their own. And the first case, by 
contrast with the second, involves the collective activity of planning 
to rob the bank. 
That is apt to seem too quick. Although the group collectively 
removed all of the money from the bank, they did not do so 
intentionally. And it isn’t unreasonable to hold that it was an action 
of theirs only insofar as it was identical with something they did 
intentionally. Furthermore, the idea that the first case distinctively 
involved collective planning raises the question whether there might 
not be more to say about the distinction between collective and 
distributed planning.  
Laurence’s positive proposal speaks to both concerns: 
 
People are acting together intentionally if and only if their actions can 
all be straightforwardly instrumentally rationalized by the same action. 
(Laurence 2011: 282, his italics.) 
 
The core of Laurence’s proposal is that, for example, in the 
collective case, the person cracking the safe is doing so because the 
group of robbers is knocking over the bank; and so forth for each 
participant in the collective activity. That is, the idea is to explain 
the occurrence of collective intentional activity by appeal to the 
possibility of rationalising each participants contribution by appeal 
to the collective activity. (We’ll return to the question whether 
Laurence is right to take these explanations to sustain 
straightforward instrumental rationalisations.) 
One worry about Laurence’s proposal is that it seems to be an 
account not of people acting together intentionally, but rather of 
their intentionally contributing at an individual level to a collective 
activity. That is, the proposal tells us that an individual intentionally 
contributes to a collective activity just in case their contribution is 
rationalised by the collective activity. Connectedly, the proposal 
seems to presuppose, rather than to explain, the collective activities 
that figure in the required rationalisations. If we lacked an 
understanding of what it is for the group of robbers collectively to 
be knocking over the bank, we would not be able to appeal to that 
activity in rationalising the activities of any individual robber and so 
in explaining their individual activities by appeal to the end with 
which they are undertaken. However, both worries can perhaps be 
finessed by viewing the proposal as one of mutual dependence: there 
being a collective intentional activity requires that the collective 
activity serve as each participant’s end; and that a collective activity 
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is some individual’s end requires that that there be such a collective 
activity, at least in prospect. 
When construed in that way, Laurence’s proposal goes beyond 
minimalism in imposing a general requirement on collective 
intentional activities according to which they depend on 
distributive rationalisation. That is, Laurence rejects the possibility 
of collective activity that is only collectively intentional—that is, the 
ends of which do not derive directly from the ends of individual 
participants. So, Laurence rejects the possibility of collective 
activities that are intentional only because they are rationalised by 
further collective activities, or that are intentional without being 
rationalised by specific further activities. Relatedly, he rejects the 
possibility of collective y-ing that is intentional due to participants’ 
distributed ends other than that of collectively y-ing. 
 
 
7. With this broad conception of intentional collective activities in 
hand, we can begin to develop the second strategy for explaining 
non-observational knowledge of what others are up to. The strategy 
takes off from the idea that collective intentional activity is like 
individual intentional activity in involving non-observational 
knowledge of intention. In the individual case, one who is j-ing 
intentionally thereby knows without observation that they are j-
ing. By direct analogy, then, the thought is that in the collective 
case, those who are collectively j-ing intentionally thereby know 
without observation that they are collectively j-ing. 
 Suppose that is granted, as in (I). The next thought is that it 
sustains (II) and thence (III): 
 
I. The participants in a collective activity know without 
observation what they are collectively up to; 
II. Each of the participants in a collective activity knows without 
observation what they are collectively up to;  
III. Each of the participants in a collective activity knows without 
observation what each of the other participants is up to. 
 
If (I–III) could be made out, then we would have a second 
explanation of the possibility of non-observational knowledge of 
what someone else is up to that is based on the possibility of 
collective intentional activity. The task facing the proponent of the 
second strategy is to defend (I–III). 
The first and most pressing difficulty concerns the transition 
from (I) to (II). The difficulty is concealed by the surface form of 
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(I). On a distributive reading of (I), the contained attribution of 
knowledge is analytically equivalent to that in (II). However, the 
reading required by the analogy with the singular case is one on 
which the activity and the knowledge are treated in the same way, 
and so on which “The participants know” takes a collective reading. 
On that reading, that the participants know without observation 
what they are up to fails to analytically entail that each of the 
participants knows without observation what they are up to. That 
doesn’t preclude a non-analytic mode of entailment, but it places 
the onus on the proponent of the second strategy to make its case. 
It would be natural for the proponent of the second strategy 
to try to exploit Laurence’s account of collective intentional 
activity. Recall that on his account, some people are participating in 
a collective intentional activity just in case each of them is acting in 
a way that is straightforwardly rationalised by the collective activity. 
Exploiting that account, it might be proposed that where someone’s 
acting is straightforwardly rationalised by a collective activity, they 
will know about the collective activity without observation. Thus, 
the idea would be to appeal to a collective analogue of the following 
transition: 
 
a. S is j-ing because S is y-ing;  
b. S is j-ing in order to be (/with the intention of) y-ing (from a. on 
the assumption that it provides for a straightforward instrumental 
rationalisation of S’s j-ing); 
c. S knows without observation that S is j-ing in order to be y-ing 
(from b. by the assumed connection between acting with an 
intention and knowing without observation what one is up to). 
 
In the previous section, we accepted a partially collective analogue 
of (a): 
 
a'. S is j-ing because they (a plurality of individuals, including S) 
are y-ing. 
 
In order for this to provide for a straightforward instrumental 
rationalisation, it must sustain transposition into a form analogous 
to (b). The second difficulty facing the proponent of the second 
strategy is to present and defend an appropriate transposition. 
 Laurence proposes (in effect) the following transposition: 
 
b'. S is j-ing in order to (/be) y(/-ing), 
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where y-ing is a collective activity (Laurence 2011: 281–2). The 
problem with (b') is that it is ill-formed. In order to be well-formed, 
y(-ing) must be attached to an appropriate subject. The only subject 
to which explicit reference is made is S, but S can’t be the subject of 
a collective activity. To be well-formed, (b') must incorporate an 
appropriately numbered subject—say, “they”. The problem now is 
that the implied subject cannot straightforwardly be restored. The 
nearest approximation seems to be (b"): 
 
b''. S is j-ing in order that they (/be) y(/-ing). 
 
However, it’s far from clear that (b") supplies a straightforward 
instrumental rationalisation of S’s j-ing. The problem is that in 
order for the intended end to underwrite practical knowledge, the 
end must be of a form that both underwrites S’s holding true that 
they will attain the end and also directly brings about that they 
attain it. While (b") fulfils the first requirement, it fails the second. 
For its attribution of the collectively-directed intention is restricted 
to forms of intention captured by “S intends that X y-s” or “S 
intends X to y”, where “X” picks out who it is that S intends will y 
(in (b"), the people picked out by “they”). By contrast with the 
singular form of intention, attributed via “S intends to y”, those 
forms of intention can’t figure in directly bringing about anyone’s 
y-ing. (For relevant discussion, see Alvarez 2010; Baier 1970; 
Campbell 2019; Clark 2001; Higginbotham 2003; Hornsby 2003, 
2016; Madden 2011; Mueller 1974, 1977; Rumfitt 1994.) 
Assume that the second problem can be solved. The question 
now is whether it can be solved in a way that sustains a transition to 
(c"): 
 
c''. S knows without observation that S is j-ing in order that they (/be) 
y(/-ing). 
 
Laurence is sceptical. At one point, he allows that a collective that 
is acting intentionally can meet operative requirements on their 
having knowledge without observation if at least one participant 
knows without observation what the collective is up to. At another, 
he allows that operative requirements can be met if there is purely 
collective knowledge without observation of what the collective is 
up to (Laurence 2011: 287–288, 291–294). Since he hopes to defend 
an appropriate analogue of (b), as part of his attempt to go beyond 
minimalism, he must reject the transition from it to (c"). 
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The claim that participants in a collective action might 
contribute intentionally without knowing non-observationally that 
they were doing so would stymy the second strategy. Independently 
of that, the rejection of the transition from analogue of (b) to 
analogue of (c) is sufficiently problematic that it would seem safer 
to reject the transition from (a) to analogue of (b) that took us 
beyond minimalism. If Laurence’s attempt to go beyond 
minimalism by requiring that collective intentions distribute forces 
us to allow that collective intentional activity fails to sustain non-
observational knowledge, then that would be a reason for resisting 
the attempt.  
Be that as it may, the proponent of the second strategy is 
required to endorse the transition from (a) to analogue of (c). The 
upshot to this point is that it is not obvious that they are entitled to 
do so. Supposing that we nonetheless grant them the transition, will 
that serve to carry through the second strategy? No. At best, it takes 
us only to (II). The proponent of the second strategy still faces the 
task of explaining the transition from there to (III)—from 
individual knowledge without observation of the collective’s activity 
to individual knowledge without observation of other participant’s 
activities. The fourth difficulty is that this transition is, again, 
unsupported by the logic of collective predication. And the fact that 
there is no analytic entailment from collective to distributive 
predication is all the more problematic at this point, since the 
required transition is between contents of pieces of knowledge. An 
account is required of how an individual participant’s knowing 
without observation that they are collectively y-ing can put the 
individual in a position to know of any one amongst the y-ers that 
they are j-ing. Even if it could be made out that the required 
transition from collective to distributive holds of necessity, that 
would help only to the extent that its necessity is available to 
subjects without observation. 
The best hope for defending such a connection would be via a 
very general characterisation of what individual participants in y-
ing are up to. For example, one might try to defend the claim that 
(i) and (ii) are available both to, and with respect to, individual 
participants, and can sustain the transition to (iii): 
 
i. They are y-ing; 
ii. S is amongst them; 
iii. S is contributing, somehow, to their y-ing. 
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One difficulty is that it is far from obvious that participants need 
know that any particular S is amongst the participants. (See Martin 
2014: 30–31.) Certainly, it is not obvious that that knowledge is 
available without observation. Another difficulty is that the lack of 
specificity in the consequent knowledge is, at best, disappointing. 
 
 
8. I’ve outlined two strategies for explaining the possibility of non-
observational knowledge of what someone else is up to. The first 
strategy appealed to the possibility of acquiring knowledge of what 
someone is up to by accepting their testimony. Its central idea was 
that testimony can preserve the credentials of the knowledge whose 
propagation it enables. I considered whether that idea can be 
defended on the basis of Anscombe’s (and Plato’s) distinction 
between elements in a warrant for a piece of knowledge and 
conditions that enable those elements to figure in the warrant. 
More work is required to fill out that defence, but its prospects are 
not outrageously bleak. The second strategy appealed to the 
possibility of collective intentional activities. Its central idea was 
that just as an individual can know without observation what they 
are up to, a collective can know without observation what they are 
up to. The main challenge facing this strategy is to parlay that idea 
into an account of an individual’s knowing without observation 
what another individual is up to. I suggested that a number of 
serious obstacles stand in the way of carrying through that project. 
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